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Some philosophers and biologists believe that there is a distinct and unique 
macroevolutionary process, while others are of the opinion that there is not. 
Contemporary opinions on this issue are presented in Dietrich’s and Erwin’s 
respective essays published in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology, 
edited by F. Ayala and R. Arp. Contrary to the paper titles (Microevolution and 
Macroevolution are Governed by the Same Processes and Microevolution and 
Macroevolution are Not Governed by the Same Processes), indicating appar-
ently contradictory attitudes, the two authors’ viewpoints are much more subtle 
and nuanced. The set of assumptions of Dietrich’s extrapolation view appears 
to be inconsistent, and the theory may be saved by a shift to paraconsistent 
logic which, in spite of the contradiction, does not lead to the collapse of the 
theory. On the other hand, Erwin’s hierarchic view implicitly supports the ex-
isting logic of the superordinate theory, believing that there is evidence that at 
least in one case it is possible to prove that macroevolution cannot be reduced 
to a microevolutionary process. The study of emergence would indicate the ac-
ceptability of the claim that geographic range at the species level represents a 
weakly emergent phenomenon which cannot be explained by being reduced to 
microevolution processes. Nevertheless, the hierarchical view still seems to lack 
sufficient convincing evidence for that claim.
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macroevolution, process of macroevolution.
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Introduction 
For some authors macroevolution represents the central concern in evolu-
tionary theory1, the crucial question being whether macroevolution and mi-
croevolution are the same processes or not2. Assumptions concerning diverse 
micro and macroevolutionary processes question the hard core of evolutionary 
synthesis, according to which microevolution and macroevolution are pro-
duced by identical microevolutionary processes. This essay questions the va-
lidity of the perspective that implies a revision or extension of the evolutionary 
synthesis in this case. The first section considers the opposing perspectives on 
the process or processes that are the bases for microevolutionary and macro-
evolutionary phenomena. Section Two is aimed at presenting the scope of the 
topic from the perspective of both views. Section Three reduces the discus-
sion to the exploration of both perspectives in two respects: first, through an 
internal critique that explores the logical consistency of the set of assumptions 
of each perspective; and, second, through an external critique that compares 
selected views towards different ontological hypotheses. An external critique is 
necessary due to the fact that both positions could be logically consistent, but 
since they are in opposition to one another, both of them cannot be truthful. 
Consequently, this type of critique is primarily aimed at verifying whether the 
premises of the two viewpoints are acceptable, focusing upon the case of spe-
cies selection. Subjecting both perspectives to two types of critique allows for 
a clear decision concerning the nature of the causal mechanism in microevolu-
tion and macroevolution, as well as an insight into the possible implications of 
that decision concerning the hard core contemporary synthesis perspective, as 
it is presented in the fourth section. 
1. Standard And Nonstandard Perspective
A majority of scientists perceive macroevolution and microevolution as two 
distinct3 and well defined phenomena:
Microevolution usually refers to the changes in allele frequency within a spe-
cies that ultimately affect the phenotype of organisms that make up the species. 
Macroevolution refers to the changes that are across species, such as when a 
1 D. SEPKOSKI, Macroevolution, in: M. RUSE (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of 
Biology, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 2008, 211-237.
2 F. AYALA and R. ARP, Are Macroevolution and Microevolution Governed by the same 
Processes? Introduction, in: F. AYALA and R. ARP (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy 
of Biology, Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009, 165-167.
3 M. R. DIETRICH, Microevolution and Macroevolution are Governed by the Same Processes, 
in: F. AYALA and R. ARP (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology, Malden, MA, 
USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2009, 169-179.
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new genus, phylum, or family emerges (form of speciation), or when species go 
extinct...4
The unquestioned distinctiveness of the two phenomena is followed by a 
dilemma on their meaning and governing processes: which phenomena occur 
often? It is not clear what real evolution is, since some identify evolution with 
microevolution, while others believe that real evolution is only macroevolu-
tion5. Also, the problem is in the determination of the causal processes for both 
phenomena: the extrapolation position is in line with the evolutionary synthe-
sis, where the existence of unique macroevolutionary process is questioned6. 
The standard position on evolutionary synthesis explains macroevolution 
as a sequence of successful microevolutionary processes. The key difference 
between the opposing positions lies in the role and reach of microevolution-
ary mechanisms. In other words, it is necessary to answer the question, are 
microevolutionary mechanism able to explain macroevolutionary phenomena 
of genesis, development and extinction of taxonomy groups above the species 
level?
1.1 Standard, extrapolation view
Neo-Darwinists explain species multiplication and genealogical patterns 
of species and organism change through the gradual and slow accumulation 
of genetic variations, which are then subject to genetic drift, natural selec-
tion, and other established microevolutionary processes. The contemporary 
evolution synthesis explanation is extrapolative: macroevolution processes are 
an extrapolation of microevolution processes at higher hierarchical levels of 
taxonomy organization without separate macroevolutionary mechanism. This 
standard position is not universally accepted, and one of the numerous scientif-
ic challenges is saltationism, macromutation theory which claims that a single 
mutational event can produce phenotypic changes that result in relatively rapid 
speciation. Also, there is a well supported evidence of Goldschmidt’s proposal 
that changes in developmentally important genes can cause large phenotypic 
change, which leads to so-called hopeful monsters. New genetic mechanism 
hold that for a transition from one species toward another it is not sufficient 
to have a constant gathering of micromutations, but there is also a need for 
large morphological changes that result in the development of a new species. 
This new genetic mechanism, systemic mutation, arises due to numerous chro-
mosomal rearrangements which constitute new forms of genetic structure, 
4 F. AYALA and R. ARP, Are Macroevolution and Microevolution Governed by the same 
Processes? Introduction, in: F. AYALA and R. ARP (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy 
of Biology, Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009b, 165-167.
5 E. SOBER, Philosophy of Biology, Boulder, Westview Press, 2000.
6 D. SEPKOSKI, 2008, o. c.
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which later form new chemical systems and reaction routes that correspond to 
new phenotypes. Dietrich believes that there are diverse mechanisms capable 
of leading to a macroevolution outcome, therefore: »This distinction between 
process and outcome is crucial for contemporary research...«7 Dietrich does 
not believe the claim that a macroevolution outcome can only be produced 
by a macroevolution processes. He finds support for his thesis in experiments 
on Drosophila Ubx genes (hox ultrabithorax genes) that confirm dramatic 
macroevolutionary changes in body plan and the number of extremities due to 
microevolution processes that erase or exchange of some R amino acids in the 
amino acid chain C-terminus. This case is an example of an evo-devo explana-
tion, where small genetic changes produce larger phenotypic changes (such as 
structural changes in the extremities), and actually have a significant role in 
the production and maintenance of diverse life forms8.
The standard position is not disputing the definition of macroevolution as a 
change that is above the species level nor does that definition imply a revision 
of the definition of macroevolution. This occurs due to the fact that higher level 
taxonomic groups such as Genus, Familia or Phylum are perceived as an epis-
temological convention and not as an ontological reality9. In cases when the 
ontological species reality is recognized10 as a separate entity with properties 
of an individual11 that is born and dies, the question becomes, does Stanley’s12 
species selection present a unique macroevolutionary process. Does it separate 
species selection from species sorting, differentiating the birth and death of 
single entities in a population? Dietrich suggests the existence of the rare sepa-
rate macroevolutionary processes of small value:
Rather than deny that distinct macroevolutionary processes are possible and 
present in nature, I claim that such processes are possible in the case of species 
selection, but are relatively rare and so are of minor evolutionary consequence 
when the entirety of the domain of evolutionary biology is considered13.
Species selection has been rarely observed because the geological process of 
change is slow. This epistemological limitation is introduced by Dobzhansky14 
7 M. R. DIETRICH, 2009, o. c., p. 172.
8 J. S. ROBERT, Evo-devo, in: M. Ruse (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology, New 
York, NY, Oxford University Press, 2008, 291-310. 
9 D. SEPKOSKI, 2008, o. c.
10 While taking into account differentiation category of species and species as taxa. The success 
of practical definition of species does not imply their ontological reality.
11 S. M. Stanley (1975), D. Hull (1992), K. De Queiroz and M. J. Donoghue (1998) and S. J. Gould 
(2002) are some of those who advocate species as individuals.
12 S. M. STANLEY, A theory of evolution above the species level, Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences (USA), (1975) 72, 646-650 and S. M. STANLEY, Macroevolution: Pattern 
and process, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, 1979.
13 M. R. DIETRICH, 2009, o .c. p. 176.
14 T. DOBZHANSKY, Genetics and the origin of species, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1937.
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as a reshaped ontological determination »...reluctantly to put a sign of equality 
between the mechanisms of macro and micro-evolution...« and methodologi-
cal obligation »...what could be known with the program of experimental evo-
lutionary genetics...«15. The standard position claims numerous, more frequent 
and more important selections at the level of individual organisms than at the 
level of species and above.
1.2 Non-standard, hierarchical view
Sepkoski writes that many doubt in the strength and reach of the microevo-
lutionary explanation of evolution:
...the mechanisms of microevolution only explain the emergence and survival 
of small variations within populations (a slightly brighter coat, a minutely 
sharper beak, etc.)16.
Naturally, the size of phenotype changes does not represent a crucial value 
here: it is rather whether there are processes producing a new species oper-
ating exclusively at the species level or higher. The nonstandard, hierarchical 
position, assumes diverse nature of microevolutionary and macroevolution-
ary process, and irreducibility of macroevolution patterns on microevolution. 
Erwin writes that challenges to the idea of sameness of microevolution and 
macroevolution come from three different areas:
...1) Selection among species, (2) the sources of variation and constraint, and (3) 
the non-uniformitarian nature of the evolutionary process itself17.
Erwin believes that a confirmation of differences among micro and mac-
roevolutionary processes requires a determination of an exclusive disjunction 
in at least one of the listed cases. In the first case it should be determined that 
macroevolutionary trends reflect selection among species and not within spe-
cies; in the second case it should rely on all comprehensible sources of variation 
and limitations at the molecular level, some of which suggests the existence of 
a separate macroevolutionary mechanism (without defining the mechanism 
type); in the third case it is necessary to make sure that those experiments 
which assume evolutionary rates, mechanisms and processes that can be car-
ried out today, are not sufficient for the explanation of the change of evolu-
tionary patterns that are measured by the geological timeline, as evolutionary 
uniformitarians claims18. The theory of punctuated equilibrium, currently the 
15 M. R. DIETRICH, 2009, o. c. p. 170.
16 D. SEPKOSKI, 2008, o. c. p. 212.
17 D. H. ERWIN, 2009. Microevolution and Macroevolution are Not Governed by the Same 
Processes, in: F. AYALA and R. ARP (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology, 
Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2009, 180-193, p.181.
18 D. H. ERWIN, 2009, o. c.
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strongest scientific objection to the natural selection principle as the universal 
micro and macro mutation causal process19, perceives species as evolutionary 
independent individuals that suddenly appear and diminish in the fossil record 
and does not bring into question the role of the microevolution mechanism but 
rather points to the possibility that: 
... these unrevised microevolutionary mechanisms do not hold exclusive sway 
in evolutionary explanation, and that their domain of action must be restricted 
(or at least shared) at the level of macroevolutionary pattern over geological 
scales ...20.
Contemporary thought on this issue is directed towards questioning the 
existence of emergent properties at the species level21. Geographic range could 
be an example of the emergent properties: 
To the extent that geographic range is a result of such complex and non-linear 
processes, it is not explainable as a result of microevolutionary processes and 
is emergent22.
The argument which supports a unique macroevolutionary process is that 
the directions of long-term macroevolutionary processes oppose the trends 
of microevolutionary processes operating in the same species. Some of these 
long-term morphological directions and limitations survived despite radi-
cal changes in environment and even through mass extinctions23. For Erwin 
mass extinctions are another example of macroevolutionary processes that 
are not governed by microevolution. In pre-theoretical belief, it appears that 
mass extinctions represent the principle of destruction and restrictions rather 
than creating evolutionary novelties. Nevertheless, new comprehensions that 
have originated in the evo-devo area (parallel development of animals from 
diverse monophyletic groups) show mass extinctions represent another im-
portant possible source of variation, by forming new niches within emerging 
ecosystems. The third challenge to the standard explanation is in its denial of 
its hard core, the principle of evolutionary uniformitarianism which assumes 
the timely invariance of the properties of biological entities. Evolutionary uni-
formitarianism assumes that the contemporary experiments of evolutionary 
rates, mechanisms and processes are sufficient to explain the change of geo-
logical evolutionary patterns. Nevertheless, Erwin believes that:
19 J. TRAVIS and D. N. REZNICK, Adaptation, in: M. RUSE and J. TRAVIS (eds.), Evolution: The 
First Four Billion Years, Cambridge, MA, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009, 
105-131.
20 S. J. GOULD, Punctuated Equilibrium, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2007, p. 58.
21 S. J. GOULD, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2002, p. 673. writes that: »Emergent characters belong exclusively to the 
species.« 
22 D. H. ERWIN, 2009, o. c. p. 185.
23 D. H. ERWIN, 2009, o. c.
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There is no necessary reason why evolutionary uniformitarianism should be 
correct; it is simply an implicit assumption of most evolutionary biologists24.
Evolutionary uniformitarianism has certain weaknesses. The first deficien-
cy is in its restriction on a shorter time period that narrows the study of the 
entire dynamics of evolution since it is not possible to precisely distinguish 
the time needed for observation of environmental events over a longer time25. 
The second deficiency stems from the variability of evolutionary changes that 
have themselves evolved26. Smith and Szathamáry present the idea that diverse 
levels of selection narrow the ontological and reproductive ability of biological 
entities and strength of natural selection as unique principal of evolutionary 
change. The diverse levels of selection stand in support of the variability of 
evolutionary changes and one feature is common to many of the transitions. 
Because of that entities that were capable of independent replication before the 
transition can replicate only as part of a larger whole after it27.
Also, selection pressure on the lower level entities (replicating molecules, 
prokaryotes, asexual protists etc.) interferes with the integration of entities that 
are at a higher hierarchical level (chromosomes, eukaryotes, sexually prolifer-
ating species, multicellular species etc.). These changes form new (emergent) 
evolutionary structures that are hardly accessible or inaccessible by direct ex-
perimental observation »...because they have changed the rules of the game, 
and changed the nature of the variability upon which selection can act.«28. 
For the non-standard, hierarchical view, macroevolution is governed by a 
distinct process, and microevolution and macroevolution present many diverse 
evolutionary patterns and processes that occur on different hierarchical levels. 
Erwin believes that discussion on reducibility of macroevolutionary phenom-
ena on microevolutionary processes is an empirical and not theoretical (philo-
sophical) question.
2. Internal And External Critique Of Two Positions
The internal critique investigates the logic consistency of a system of 
thought, making sure that it does not contain any contradictory claims. This 
type of critique audits use of the basic and overall assumption which is in the 
basis of the system. Nevertheless, if the principal assumptions are metaphysical 
axiom, the whole evaluation requires an external critique. This type of critique 
24 D. H. ERWIN, 2009, o. c. p. 188.
25 D. H. ERWIN and R. L. ANSTEY, Speciation in the fossil record, in: M. RIDLEY (ed.), Evolution, 
New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 2004, 185-197.
26 D. H. ERWIN, 2009, o. c.
27 M. J. SMITH and E. SZATHAMÁRY, The major transitions in evolution, New York, NY, W. H. 
Freeman, 1995.
28 D. H. ERWIN, 2009, o. c. p. 189.
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is necessary because both positions could be logically consistent, but since 
they are in opposition both of them cannot be truthful. External critique is 
interested in relation of metaphysical-epistemological basis of studied system 
towards theoretical contributions of new insights in approaching the truth.
2.1 Internal critique
In his paper Dietrich does not want to polarise those views in accordance 
with the principle of »all or nothing«, but rather seems to be directing the dis-
cussion towards the question of the relative importance of distinct micro and 
macroevolutionary processes. According to him, microevolutionary processes 
are much more frequent than unique macroevolutionary processes and are 
therefore of greater significance in explaining the emergence of both microevo-
lutionary and macroevolutionary phenomena. Dietrich claims the existence 
of distinct macroevolutionary processes (explicitly in the case of the species 
selection) and a possibility of discovering new macroevolutionary processes. 
It is by these claims that the set of hypotheses in the solid core of evolutionary 
theory, coupled with classic logic, are rendered inconsistent with regard to that 
same logic, and inconsistency is one of the modes in which a failure of a theory 
emerges or becomes manifest. If we were to think of Dietrich’s hypotheses as 
premises pertaining to a logical set of well-formed formulae (wwf), they should 
be followed by an argument conclusion. The argument is logically valid if the 
conclusion follows from the premises in all interpretations of the formal lan-
guage, i.e. the conclusion results from the premises if and only if it is true in 
all the interpretations of non-logical terms in which the premises are true. In 
this case the set of all the sentences ensuing from that set could be referred to 
as a theory based on these assumptions. Consistency means that if within the 
theory there is truth-bearer A, it is impossible for both A and ¬A to be true. 
Furthermore, as classic logic maintains, if one theory is consistent, some sen-
tences do not ensue from it. In accordance with this, the set of assumptions of 
evolutionary theory, as interpreted by means of the extrapolation view, coupled 
with classic logic, would seem to be inconsistent due to the fact that classic logic 
observes the principle ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ), according to which, 
in case of at least one contradiction, the theory is rendered inconsistent and is 
consequently not logically valid. The theory can be saved by means of a change 
in logic. As paraconsistent logic has it, it is not true that anything following 
from contradictory premises is explosive (ECQ).29 The logical validity of the ex-
trapolation view of evolutionary theory can be preserved by departing from the 
trivialism of classic logic which demands the truth of everything. Tanaka be-
29 For standard and some other definitions of paraconsistency see G. ROBBLES, Weak consistency 
and strong paraconsistency, Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 
(2009) 7, 185-193.
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lieves this to be possible because inconsistency is pervasive in our rational life 
and trivialism is rationally unacceptable30. Practical rationality may require a 
choice between incompatible convictions. However, Tanaka’s claim may prove 
to be too strong since no one seems to wish for inconsistency in their system 
of thought. On the contrary, theoretical rationality calls for the elimination of 
inconsistency wherever it is detected. But, it seems that Dietrich’s claims shows 
the inconsistency of the extrapolation view as a local phenomenon which does 
not result in the global destruction of his viewpoint and evolutionary theory, 
thereby rendering the extrapolation view paraconsistent. Dietrich’s viewpoint 
is paraconsistent because it does not bring about a collapse of evolutionary 
theory, but seems to be, on the other hand, weakly inconsistent according to 
at least one definition31 since it contains a negation of a superordinate logic, in 
this case evolutionary theory. The hierarchic view assumes, either explicitly or 
implicitly, premises leading to a different conclusion:32 (i) microevolutionary 
process is not sufficient to explain the emergence of macroevolution; (ii) there 
is evidence that in at least one case macroevolution can be explained by the 
macroevolutionary process. The hierarchic view would therefore represent a 
theory of a lower order, comprising assumptions (i) and (ii) which seem to be 
contradictory to the superordinate logic of evolutionary theory since they claim 
that macroevolutionary phenomena cannot be satisfactorily explained by the 
neo-Darwinist paradigm. However, this is where the author implicitly supports 
the existing classic logic of the superordinate theory, maintaining his premises 
to be true and the issue of macroevolution being reducible to microevolution-
ary processes to represent an empirical question. It therefore becomes neces-
sary to see whether there exist processes producing new species that work only 
at the species level or higher, whereas Erwin claims this to be the case with 
the geographic range which is not explainable as a result of microevolutionary 
processes and is emergent. This case will be examined in the next Sub-chapter 
with great care.
30 K. TANAKA, F. BERTO, E. MARES and F. PAOLI, Paraconsistency: Introduction, in: K. 
TANAKA, F. BERTO, E. MARES and F. PAOLI (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications, 
Dordrecht, Springer, 2013, 1-15.
31 G. ROBBLES, 2009, o. c.
32 The paper lists the assumptions in a logically more coherent and comprehensible form, based 
on the original parts of Erwin’s paper. They can be encountered in his paper in several places, 
and here the following have been selected: assumption (i) taken from the quotation »…that 
novel mechanisms may be responsible for macroevolutionary change.« (D. H. ERWIN, 2009, o. 
c. p. 190); and assumption (ii) taken from the quotation »Convicting demonstrations have been 
provided that geographic range is a weakly emergent, heritable trait that cannot be reduced to 
microevolution.« (D. H. ERWIN, 2009, o. c. p. 190).
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2.2 External critique
While the previous chapter dealt with the logical validity of the conclu-
sions drawn from two different views, in this chapter the acceptability of their 
premises, i.e. soundness of their arguments need to be considered. The external 
judgment of two opposite positions on the nature of micro and macroevolution 
processes weight their ontological and epistemological relation towards the is-
sue in question: is there a distinct macroevolutionary process that is indepen-
dent of the observer and is it possible to achieve reliable scientific knowledge 
about that process? While determining micro and macroevolution, Ayala and 
Arp33 place the demarcation line for the two phenomena at the species level. 
Species is the criterion of the separation, and the basic processes whose nature 
determines the possible existence of unique macroevolutionary process. The 
ontology of hierarchical levels of life is crucial in selecting between two posi-
tions, and the main dispute is in the concept of species selection. Thus Sepkoski 
writes:
This question largely hinges on the issue of hierarchy: Do major taxonomic 
groups represent real, ontologically distinct entities with their own emergent 
properties, and are the factors that govern their development discontinuous 
with the mechanisms that produce variation and fitness among individuals34?
Eldredge and Gould’s Theory of Punctuated Equilibrium has established the 
ontological reality of the species, making it possible to determine species as 
individuals, which was done by Ghiselin35, Hull36 and Lieberman and Vrba37. 
The major contribution of the Theory of Punctuated Equilibrium lies in the 
species concept because it seems to have created the possibility of the existence 
of an independent area of macroevolution:
Species represent the basic unit in theories and mechanisms of macroevolu-
tionary change... I presented the case for treating species as individuals in an 
earlier section of this chapter (pp. 603-608), noting that punctuated equilib-
rium greatly aids such delineation…38
The species can now play the same role of fundamental individual that or-
ganisms assume in microevolution39, whereby species have a birth and extinc-
tion, similar to organisms which are born and die. It is in this way that the 
33 F. AYALA and R. ARP, 2009, o. c.
34 D. SEPKOSKI, 2008, o. c. p. 212.
35 M. T. GHISELIN, A radical solution to the species problem, Systematic Zoology, (1974) 23, 
536-544.
36 D. L. HULL, Individuality and selection, Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, (1980) 11, 
311-332.
37 B. S. LIEBERMAN and E. S. VRBA, Stephen Jay Gould on species selection: 30 years of insight, 
Paleobiology (2005) 31 (2, Supplement) 113-121.
38 S. J. GOULD, 2007, o. c. p. 703-4.
39 S. J. GOULD, 2002, o. c.
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species could have become a concept that could be conceived of as individual 
evolutionary units that, to some degree independently of population-level selec-
tion, have adaptive traits of their own40. The Theory of Punctuated Equilibrium 
denies that the synthetic view of gradual accumulation of microevolutionary 
change could satisfactorily explain the change at higher taxonomic levels. This 
seems to have opened a possibility »… for a new wave of macroevolutionary 
investigation, ultimately leading to the ‘hierarchical view of life«41. As the hi-
erarchical view maintains, evolution operates on different levels of the hierar-
chy (the gene, the organism, the population, the species, taxonomic taxa, etc.) 
through different kinds of processes. The hierarchical organization of nature is 
the fact from which the proponents of the hierarchical view derive their disput-
able claims:
(a) Properties and processes at higher levels can affect the course of evolution, 
and (b) these higher-level properties and processes cannot be reduced to lower-
level properties and processes...: (c) A fully adequate theory of evolutionary 
dynamics must recognize these irreducible higher-level properties and pro-
cesses42.
To Dietrich species selection represents the most clearly articulated mac-
roevolutionary process, but the definition of species selection seems to be 
arguable since some theorists support an emergent character approach (Vrba), 
while some others seem to be more inclined towards adopting an emergence 
fitness approach (Loyd, Gould). In the second place, Dietrich admits that spe-
cies selection represents the best case of an isolated causal process, operating 
exclusively in macroevolution. However, he believes that it is the frequency of 
these events that represents the real question, the one that needs to be an-
swered. Namely, the very proponents of the hierarchical view admit there is 
too small an amount of evidence to corroborate the hierarchical view of mac-
roevolution43. Furthermore, Grantham himself mentions different denials of 
this evidence. The best known proof that macroevolution cannot be merely re-
duced to microevolutionary processes is represented by geographical range. In 
an influential paper entitled »Is macroevolution more than successive rounds 
of microevolution?«44 Grantham considers the relations between micro and 
macroevolution, different concepts of emergence and biology of geographical 
range, writing as follows: 
40 D. SEPKOSKI, 2008, o. c. p. 221.
41 D. SEPKOSKI, 2008, o. c. p. 372.
42 T. GRANTHAM, Hierarchical Approaches to Macroevolution: Recent Work on Species 
selection and the »Effect Hypothesis«, Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, (1995) 26, 
301-321, p. 302-303.
43 T. GRANTHAM, 1995, o. c.
44 It seems necessary to draw attention to the fact that Grantham places the questionnaire 
immediately below the paper title. 
Tonći Kokić, Is there a unique process which governs macroevolution?330
Thus, if geographical range is weakly emergent, it provides a basis for arguing 
that macroevolutionary phenomena cannot be fully explained by microevolu-
tionary processes45.
Grantham further claims that the geographical range is weakly emergent 
and blocks the attempt to explain all macroevolutionary phenomena in terms 
of microevolutionary processes. The problem lies in Grantham’s admission that 
geographical range size can be emergent without being heritable at the species 
level, whereas true species selection for geographical range has to be heritable46. 
Dietrich maintains that the term geographical range, as employed in Grantham’s 
study, seems like an emergent character, but if the geographical range is depen-
dent on an organismal trait, like his first evidence for hierarchical explanation 
of macroevolution (Larval Ecology in Marine Invertebrates), then it seems like 
an aggregate character47. On the other hand, when it comes to defining species 
selection, some are inclined to distinguish between selection operating on ag-
gregate, organismal characters and selection acting on true species-level char-
acters48, whereby only the selection operating on the species level characters 
qualifies as species selection49. Similarly, Jablonski and Hunt, on the basis of the 
emergence fitness approach, claim that geographical range represents genuine 
species selection, with no proof that geographical range is itself an emergent 
character. The claims taken from the discussion of this chapter represent the 
basis for the analysis of acceptability of the premises of two viewpoints under 
consideration: the extrapolation view assumes that macroevolution is caused 
by both micro and macroevolutionary processes, the microevolution processes 
being however more frequent and therefore more important. I believe that it is 
fairly clear that this claim has so far been satisfactorily proven. Erwin maintains 
that at least in one case it is possible to claim that macroevolution cannot pos-
sibly be reduced to microevolutionary processes: »Convincing demonstration 
have been provided that geographical range is a weakly emergent, heritable trait 
that cannot be reduced to microevolution.«50 I do not believe this hypothesis to 
be confirmed. First, it is obvious that there is no agreement as for the precise 
and accurate definition of the term species (an emergent character approach 
and an emergent fitness approach), upon which the results of empirical evidence 
highly depend. Second, I believe this discussion to have shown the geographical 
range to be weakly emergent; however, it has not proved to be heritable at the 
45 T. GRANTHAM, Is Macroevolution more than successive rounds of macroevolution? 
Paleontology, (2007) 50, 75-85, p. 75.
46 D. JABLONSKI and G. HUNT, Larval ecology, geographic range, and species survivorship 
in Cretaceous mollusks: organismic versus species-level explanations, American Naturalist, 
(2006) 168, 556-564.
47 M. R. DIETRICH, 2009, o. c. 
48 Lieberman and Vrba, 2005, (o. c.) provide a comprehensive table of the changes in meaning of 
the term species selection.
49 M. R. DIETRICH, 2009, o. c.
50 D. H. ERWIN, 2009, o. c. p. 190.
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species level, therefore »Whereas range size can be emergent without being her-
itable, true species selection for range would, of course, require heritability«51. 
Last, conclusions concerning the originality of species selection on the basis of 
the emergent fitness approach are possible without verifying that geographical 
range is itself an emergent character. It would be more acceptable to say that the 
range size here is proven to be emergent, regardless of heritability. Consequently, 
I think that it would be more precise to say that there is no strong or convincing 
evidence as to the existence of empirical proofs of distinct macroevolution pro-
cesses since these proofs are dependent upon the chosen definition of species se-
lection. Grantham writes: »At present, only a small handful of well-documented 
cases require hierarchical explanation.«52 I believe the hierarchical approach to 
resemble very much a house of cards: while nature is indeed hierarchically orga-
nized, the hierarchical view is based upon diverse definitions of the term species 
selection. Also, the heritability of geographical range, essential to true species 
selection for range, and the claims of one of the approaches to the definition 
of species selection fails to show that the geographical range is itself an emer-
gent character, which would seem to be necessary. In my opinion, it would be 
sensible to accept the premises of extrapolation view as already confirmed. The 
hierarchical position brings into question a standard theory, thereby bearing 
the burden of proof, but still lacking the strength to challenge it completely, or 
possessing positive empirical proof that would make the existence of a distinct 
macroevolutionary process plausible.
3. Decision And Evolutionary Synthesis Implications
On one side, the hierarchical view in Erwin’s interpretation, claiming that 
there exists a distinct macroevolutionary process, whereas on the other side 
there is the extrapolation view, as interpreted by Dietrich, maintaining that no 
accumulation of evidence is to be expected in favour of either theory. Thus the 
two views are not contradictory, since Dietrich’s interpretation seems to suggest 
a pluralist approach embracing a number of theories (sub-theories), evaluating 
and assessing their relative significance. The internal critique that explores the 
logical consistency of each perspective has established the fact that the set of 
assumption of the theory of evolution, as interpreted by the extrapolation view 
and coupled with the classic logic, is inconsistent. Furthermore, a change in 
logic would seem to render it paraconsistent, i.e. weakly inconsistent. The set 
of assumptions of the theory of evolution, as proposed by the hierarchical view, 
seems to implicitly support the existing classic logic of a superordinate theory, 
which is why the set of assumptions pertaining to the hierarchical view ap-
51 T. GRANTHAM, 2007, o. c. p. 82.
52 T. GRANTHAM, 1995, o. c. p. 318.
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pears inconsistent with respect to this logic. As claimed by the hierarchical 
view, its premises are true: therefore the issue of reducibility of macroevolution 
to microevolutionary processes would represent an empirical question. The 
external critique gives an insight into the acceptability of both views in order 
to check the soundness of their conclusions. Although I am inclined to agree 
with the set of assumptions of the extrapolation view, assuming that macro-
evolution is caused by both micro and macroevolutionary processes: however, 
microevolutionary processes, occurring far more frequently, seem to be more 
significant. Conversely, the set of assumptions pertaining to the hierarchical 
view would appear to lack a generally acceptable definition of species selection 
(emergent character approach or emergent fitness approach), the degree of ac-
ceptability of evidence depending upon the definition choice. Hence »Stricter 
emergent character definition includes fewer cases and has less potential for 
future cases«53. Similarly, some of the proposed evidence has been disputed 
and brought into question from diverse viewpoints54. 
In accordance with all of the above, I believe that several plausible conclu-
sions are possible in the dispute whether there exists a unique process govern-
ing macroevolution. First, it would imply a change in logic enabling the set of 
assumptions pertaining to the extrapolation view to become paraconsistent, 
i.e. weakly inconsistent. This would render the extrapolation view logically val-
id, its premises acceptable, and the argument sound. Second, if we admit the set 
of assumptions of the hierarchical view to be inconsistent with regard to classic 
logic of the theory of evolution, thereupon deciding that: (i) the premises have 
been confirmed while the contemporary synthesis is unacceptable; or (ii) that 
the premises are unacceptable while the contemporary synthesis is acceptable. 
Last, it may be assumed that, in order to explain macroevolution, a pluralist 
approach would be needed: an approach including all the afore-mentioned pos-
sibilities, accompanied by revising and reassessing their relative importance 
for particular areas concerning evolution, in this case macroevolution. Con-
sequently, the hierarchical position questions the extrapolation explanation of 
macroevolution, but it does not have the strength to challenge it completely nor 
does it have a positive generally acknowledged or recognized positive empirical 
proof that would make the existence of a distinct macroevolutionary process 
plausible. Hereby, the hierarchical position proves the scientific nature of the 
extrapolation position since it points to the principal falsification of the ex-
trapolation claim, which is a necessary element of scientific criteria (K. Popper 
in Logik der Forschung), but fails to refute that claim or verify claims (A. J. Ayer 
in Language, Truth and Logic) that would offer a better explanation of the mac-
roevolution phenomena formation processes. Nevertheless, it is my opinion 
that the hierarchical position has implications for evolutionary synthesis since 
53 M. R. DIETRICH, 2009, o. c. p. 174.
54 T. GRANTHAM, 1995, o. c.
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it seems to indicate a weaker inconsistency within the set of assumptions in the 
extrapolation view, coupled with classic logic. This by no means disproves the 
contemporary synthesis: rather its capacity to explain one area of evolution, 
macroevolution, is partially weakened. This also opens the hierarchical view 
a new perspective in its effort towards a more precise theoretical definition of 
the species selection and empirical evidence, which might eventually clearly 
prove the existence of distinct macroevolutionary processes, playing a major 
role in the emergence of macroevolutionary phenomena. It would seem reason-
able and rational to embrace the extrapolation view until another sub-theory 
succeeds in providing a better explanation of the processes underlying and 
governing macroevolution. The hierarchical view bears in mind the require-
ment to extend or revise the evolutionary theory. However, it has not yet be-
come topical as a calling for an emergency agenda for its immediate adoption. 
Conclusion
Suspecting that macroevolution is guided by a series of successful micro-
evolutionary changes, the hierarchical position questions the extrapolation 
position on the process that governs macroevolution, simultaneously implying 
the necessity of revision or extension of evolutionary synthesis which is in line 
with the extrapolation view. Arguments of the two positions at the internal and 
external levels indicate that both positions have deficiencies: the set of prem-
ises constituting the extrapolation view is acceptable, however, now coupled 
with classic logic, makes that logic inconsistent and can only be saved by a 
change in logic, thereby becoming more weakly inconsistent, and its premises 
not being unambiguously proved. I therefore maintain that the hierarchical 
view has not succeeded in disproving the extrapolation view, being coherent to 
contemporary synthesis. However, it seems to have indicated a weakening in 
the logic coupled with the extrapolation view and evolutionary theory, as well 
as its inferior power when it comes to the explanation of macroevolution or 
indeed a hope in the possibility of its claims being proved. The two views do not 
represent contradictions whose claims could be simply compared because they 
partially include conceptual differences, requiring a type of interpretation. 
Here the interpretation has been based upon two critiques, with a conclusion 
that the hierarchical view does not as yet possess sufficient power or strength to 
raise questions of revising or extending evolutionary synthesis, making them 
emergency items on the agenda. I would be inclined to think that this would 
require more convincing evidence, wherefore it would seem more sensible to 
give advantage to the extrapolation view and a pluralist approach which derives 
their capacity of explanation from the authority of a well-corroborated theory, 
as is the evolution synthesis.
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Tonći Kokić
Upravlja li makroevolucijom zaseban evolucijski proces?
Sažetak
Filozofi i biolozi nisu složni oko postojanja zasebnog makroevolucijskog pro-
cesa. Suvremeni filozofski stavovi oko ovog pitanja predstavljeni su analizom 
Dietrichovog i Erwinovog eseja objavljenima u zborniku Contemporary Deba-
tes in Philosophy of Biology urednika Ayale i Arpa. Suprotno naslovima eseja 
(mikroevolucija i makroevolucija su vođene istim procesom i mikroevolucija i 
makroevolucija nisu vođene istim procesom) koji upućuju na kontradiktorne 
stavove, razlike dvaju gledišta su fino iznijansirane. Analiza ukazuje na inkonzi-
stentnost Dietrichovog ekstrapolacijskog gledišta koje može biti spašeno samo 
usklađivanjem pretpostavki standardne teorije evolucije s parakonzistentnom 
logikom koja ne vodi kolapsu teorije. S druge strane, Erwinovo hijerarhijsko 
gledište implicitno podupire postojeću logiku nadređene teorije vjerujući da 
je u barem jednom slučaju moguće dokazati da makroevolucija ne može biti 
svedena na mikroevolucijski proces. Proučavanje emergencije ukazuje na pri-
hvatljivost tvrdnje da geografska raširenost na razini vrste predstavlja fenomen 
slabe emergencije koji ne može biti objašnjen svođenjem na mikroevolucijske 
procese. Slabost ovog tvrdnje je u manjku dovoljno uvjerljivih dokaza pa u ko-
načnici standardno ekstrapolacijsko gledište nije osporeno. 
Ključne riječi: ekstrapolacija, fenomen makroevolucije, geografska raširenost, 
hijerarhijsko gledište, proces makroevolucije.
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